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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
MICHAEL TODD MCARTHUR, : Case No. 981421-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The state concedes that Officer Delahunty knew of and 
acquiesced in Aimee Rolfe's conduct in searching McArthur's home. 
The circumstances relevant to the knowledge/acquiescence inquiry 
strongly demonstrate that Aimee acted as an agent for Delahunty 
because, among other things, Delahunty gave Aimee direction and 
guidance and agreed that she should enter the home and steal 
items while he waited in the driveway. 
In light of the state's concession, the only inquiry for 
this Court is whether Aimee had an independent personal reason 
which was her primary motivation for conducting the search and 
which significantly outweighed Delahunty's knowledge of and 
acquiescence in the search so as to render Aimee's search an 
independent rather than agency action. The reason the state 
attributed to Aimee for conducting the search--to come clean and 
get her life in order--necessarily involves helping the police 
obtain evidence against McArthur and is not an independent 
personal motivation. This reason contrasts with the legitimate 
independent reasons which have been upheld by other courts. Even 
if Aimee's motivation was considered to be mixed, the personal 
aspects of her motivation do not outweigh the knowledge/ 
acquiescence circumstances so as to render Aimee's search a 
personal independent action rather than a search as a police 
agent. 
Aimee's permissive access to the house does not end the 
Fourth Amendment inquiry. The state relies completely on this 
Court's decision in State v. Koury, 824 P.2d 474 (Utah App. 1991) 
to support its claim that since Aimee had permissive access to 
the house, the issue of whether she was a police agent need not 
be decided. However, Koury simply held that a private individual 
who had the right to be inside a house could "report what he 
observed in defendant's house." Koury, 824 P.2d at 478. The 
decision in Koury was based on United States v. Bennett, 709 F.2d 
803, 806 (1983), aff'd, 729 F.2d 923 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 469 
U.S. 1075, 105 S.Ct. 572, 83 L.Ed.2d 512 (1984), which supports 
Appellant's claim that an individual can act as a police agent, 
in violation of the Fourth Amendment, even though she has 
permission to be in a house. 
Additionally, the Supreme Court decision in State v. Watts, 
750 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah 1988) mandates that officers cannot 
have "informants do for them what they cannot legally do 
themselves." Id. This mandate would be violated if Officer 
Delahunty could send Aimee as an agent into the house to search 
and be free from Fourth Amendment scrutiny because she was a 
guest in the house. Moreover, assuming Aimee had permission to 
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be in the house, such permission did not include permission to 
enter as a police agent and conduct a search. Aimee's actions 
exceeded the scope of any permission she might have had; 
Appellant did not consent to a search by Aimee. Additionally, 
Aimee could not have consented to a search and therefore could 
not conduct one herself as a police agent. 
The search warrant was obtained as the fruit of the 
poisonous tree and therefore must be suppressed. Moreover, if 
the illegally seized evidence is excised and all omitted 
information considered, the affidavit failed to establish 
probable cause. 
The state incorrectly maintains that if this Court 
determines Aimee Rolfe was not an agent for Delahunty, "then the 
Fourth Amendment has no applicability." See state's brief 
("S.B.") at 9-10, 22. Even if Aimee was not an agent, Delahunty 
omitted material information, including, among other things, 
information regarding Aimee's forgery charges and possible 
involvement in the burglary. Contrary to the state's claim that 
the omitted information would have bolstered Aimee's credibility, 
it is well accepted that statements of a co-defendant are 
inherently unreliable. Aimee did not implicate herself and 
instead pointed her finger at McArthur. A magistrate who knew 
that Aimee had charges for forgery, a crime of dishonesty, 
involving checks taken in the burglary and the other information 
outlined in Appellant's opening brief ("A.O.B.") would have 
questioned Aimee's reliability. Delahunty's actions in not 
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obtaining a search warrant based only on Aimee's word emphasize 
the importance of this information and demonstrate that he acted 
intentionally or recklessly in failing to include the 
information. 
McArthur entered a conditional plea preserving l![t]he issue 
of the legality of the search warrant." R. 51. Pursuant to the 
conditional plea, reversal is required if the search warrant did 
not establish probable cause in light of the omissions or was 
obtained as the fruit of Aimee's conduct as a police agent. 
Additionally, the claim that the confession was the fruit of the 
Fourth Amendment violation was preserved in the trial court and 
by the conditional plea. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. AIMEE WAS A GOVERNMENT AGENT WHO SEIZED ITEMS 
IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT. 
A. AIMEE WAS ACTING AS A GOVERNMENT AGENT WHEN SHE 
SEIZED AND REMOVED ITEMS FROM APPELLANT'S HOME. 
(Reply to Point 1(a) of the State's Brief) 
The state concedes that Officer Delahunty knew of and 
acquiesced in Aimee Rolfe's conduct in entering Appellant's home 
and seizing items. S.B. at 9-10, 14. Hence, the first inquiry 
under the test articulated in Watts, 750 P.2d at 1221-22 weighs 
in favor of suppression. 
The state attempts to minimize the weight of the 
circumstances demonstrating that Officer Delahunty knew of and 
acquiesced in Aimee's conduct by equating his knowledge/ 
acquiescence with the act of simply relying on informants. S.B. 
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at 14-15. The state argues that "the mere fact that Officer 
Delahunty [worked with an informant] should be insufficient to 
establish an agency relationship" and that "the inquiry must 
proceed to an analysis of the intent and purpose underlying 
[Aimee] Rolfe's conduct and to the subsidiary issues identified 
by this Court in Koury." S.B. at 14-15. 
This case involves more than the simple reliance on 
informants for information which was referred to in Watts, 750 
P.2d at 1221. Instead, it involves conduct by Officer Delahunty 
demonstrating he knew of and acquiesced in the search, and 
strongly indicating that Aimee acted as his agent. In fact, 
Delahunty testified that "she obtained [the] property for [him] 
on June 30th." R. 114:43. 
Although the Supreme Court recognized in Watts that an 
officer can obtain information from informants without creating 
an agency relationship, it clarified that under the totality of 
the circumstances, the seizure in that case was the independent 
act of a private individual and not the act of a government agent 
only because "[t]he police did not give the informant any 
direction or guidance, nor did they tell him to enter anyone's 
property or do anything illegal to obtain evidence." Watts, 750 
P.2d at 1220. In contrast, in the instant case, none of these 
three criteria were met: (1) Officer Delahunty gave Aimee 
direction and guidance by taking her to the house and indicating 
that she should remove certain specified items; Aimee's search 
would not have occurred if Delahunty had not taken her to the 
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house and agreed that she should remove specific items and bring 
them to him (R. 114:18, 24-5, 28, 64-5); (2) Officer Delahunty 
.agreed that Aimee should enter the home, and made it possible for 
her to do so by picking her up in West Jordan, transporting her 
across the valley to the McArthur house, and waiting in the 
driveway (R. 114:23, 27-8, 46-7); (3) Officer Delahunty indicated 
Aimee should steal items from the house when he agreed that she 
should enter and remove the items (R. 114:65), thereby telling 
her to do something illegal. The circumstances surrounding 
Officer Delahunty's knowledge of and acquiescence in Aimee's 
conduct weigh heavily in favor of a determination that Aimee was 
a government agent and should not be given the cursory attention 
suggested by the state. 
In light of the state's concession and the facts supporting 
that concession, the only determination left for this Court is 
whether the facts related to the motivational inquiry, "the 
intent and purpose of the person(s) or body(ies) conducting the 
search" (Watts, 750 P.2d at 1221-2), weigh so strongly against 
concluding that Aimee was an agent that they outweigh the 
circumstances demonstrating that Delahunty knew of and acquiesced 
in Aimee's conduct. 
The state claims that Aimee "was acting for the most part on 
her own" and that her motivation was primarily personal. S.B. at 
15. The state bases this claim on Delahunty's hearsay testimony 
that Aimee told him she "wanted to come clean and get her life in 
order" and knew what she had done in the past was wrong, and the 
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state's speculation that Aimee was trying to make a final break 
with McArthur and get a fresh start. S.B. at 15. 
The way Aimee intended to come clean and get her life in 
order was by helping police collect evidence against Appellant. 
This necessarily involves a motivation to help police. Aimee's 
intent in entering McArthur's house and taking the items was to 
seize items for police. Hence, Aimee's intent was to act as an 
instrument or agent of the police; although she hoped her actions 
would improve her life, that desire was not independent of her 
intent to aid police. 
Aimee's purported desire to get her life in order by helping 
police gather evidence contrasts with the legitimate independent 
motivations which have been upheld. See e.g. United States v. 
Andrini, 685 F.2d 1094, 1097-8 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. 
Gomez, 614 F.2d 643, 644 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. 
Chukwubike, 956 F.2d 209 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 504 U.S. 945, 
112 S.Ct. 2288, 119 L.Ed.2d 212 (1992). 
In Andrini, a motel clerk opened a suitcase that had no 
identification tags and which had been delivered to the wrong 
guest. The independent motivation for conducting the search was 
to follow routine procedure so as to ascertain the owner. In 
fact, although an officer was nearby when the clerk opened the 
bag, the officer had not told the clerk of the officer's belief 
that the bag belonged to Andrini. Andrini, 685 F.2d at 1097-8; 
see also Gomez, 614 F.2d at 644-5 (routine search of bag without 
identification tags to ascertain owner was based on independent 
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motivation). By contrast, in the present case, Aimee knew that 
she was taking evidence for the officer and was motivated by her 
desire to aid the officer and the subsidiary impact of such 
assistance on her quality of life. 
Chukwubike is similar to Andrini and Gomez in that the 
motivation for the search was independent from a desire to help 
police. Doctors removed numerous balloons filled with heroin in 
order to save Chukwubike's life after Chukwubike swallowed the 
heroin balloons. 956 F.2d at 211. Unlike the present case where 
any motivation Aimee had to better her life was dependent on 
helping the police gather evidence, the private citizens in 
Gomez, Andrini and Chukwubike had an independent reason for 
conducting the procedure, and would have opened the suitcase or 
conducted the operation regardless of whether it would have aided 
officers. See also United States v. Reed, 15 F.3d 928, 932 (9th 
Cir. 1994)(crime prevention is not a personal motivation 
independent of a motivation to help police). Because Aimee would 
not have conducted the search and removed the items absent 
Officer Delahunty's agreement and involvement, her purported 
desire to get her life in order was not an independent personal 
motivation. 
Both this Court and the state recognize that the motivation 
of an individual who conducts a search is likely to be mixed. 
S.B. at 15 n. 10; Koury, 824 P.2d at 478 n. 2. Because of this 
mixed motivation, in analyzing the motivational inquiry, the 
Supreme Court has considered whether the individual's actions 
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"were for the most part his own and were not substantially 
motivated by the prompting and encouragement of the [police]." 
Watts, 750 P.2d at 1223. Even if Aimee's motivations were 
considered to be mixed, they were not "for the most part [her] 
own" and were "substantially motivated by the prompting and 
encouragement of police," since she would not have conducted the 
search without the agreement and help of Officer Delahunty. See 
id. 
Moreover, the conduct of the police officer impacts on the 
motivational inquiry. See Reed, 15 F.3d at 932 (officers who 
were present during the search protected individual and 
essentially served as lookouts; participation was significant and 
indicated that motivation for search was primarily to aid 
police). In other words, where police officers assist, prompt or 
encourage an individual to conduct a search, the motivation is 
less likely to be primarily personal. 
Although Delahunty indicated that Aimee came up with the 
idea of searching McArthur's home and told Delahunty what items 
she could take, Aimee would not have conducted the search without 
Delahunty's prompting and encouragement. Had Aimee turned the 
items over to officers before Delahunty sought her out, or even 
after she and Delahunty began meeting, but without Delahunty's 
help and without waiting two weeks, the state might have more of 
an argument that Aimee's motivation was primarily personal. 
The facts show, however, that Aimee did not remove the items 
of her own volition, did not approach police officers on her own, 
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and went to the police station to talk with Delahunty only after 
he made her nervous by seeking her out and trying to talk with 
her at the McArthur home. R. 114:7, 17, 46, 65. The facts also 
show that during the two weeks between June 17, 1997, when Aimee 
talked to Delahunty at the police station, and June 30, 1997, the 
day Delahunty took her to the McArthur home to conduct a search, 
Aimee did not act on her own to remove the items. Instead, she 
waited until Delahunty arranged the search and transported her to 
the McArthur home. Aimee relied on Delahunty's assistance in 
transporting her as well as his assistance in waiting in the 
driveway; if Aimee ran into problems while searching McArthur's 
house, she had a police officer in the driveway to assist her. 
Delahunty's assistance, encouragement and prompting were critical 
to the search. 
The state also claims that Delahunty did not "make offers of 
reward or otherwise entice Rolfe to cooperate" and suggests 
therefore that Aimee's motivation was personal. S.B. at 17. The 
record is silent as to whether officers other than Delahunty 
indicated Aimee might benefit or whether Aimee believed she might 
benefit in regard to her own criminal charges if she helped 
implicate Appellant.1 Even if the record clearly showed, 
1
 It is safe to assume that an individual in Aimee's 
position, facing charges for forgery as well as the possibility 
officers might think she was involved in the burglary, would think 
that she might be better off in regard to her own criminal cases if 
she were to help police officers. Delahunty indicated that "eighty 
percent" of her reason for "coming forward" was that she was in 
trouble. R. 114:40. Even without a specific offer, it is a 
fiction to suggest that someone in Aimee's position would not think 
that she might benefit from helping police. 
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however, that Aimee was not given offers or enticement, such a 
fact works both ways in assessing whether motivation for the 
search was personal. Without reward, offers or enticement from 
police, the motivation for conducting a search and turning 
evidence over to police is arguably more apt to be based on a 
desire to help officers than on personal motivation; the 
motivation is to help police gather evidence rather than personal 
gain. On the other hand, if the officers pay or reward a person 
to conduct a search, the person appears to be employed as an 
agent. Because this consideration is ambiguous, it should be 
given little weight, especially where an officer has actively 
assisted, prompted and encouraged the individual to conduct the 
search, as occurred in this case. 
The totality of the circumstances in this case demonstrates 
that Aimee acted as a police agent when she searched Appellant's 
home and seized items. 
B. PERMISSIVE ACCESS TO THE HOUSE DOES NOT PRECLUDE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION. 
(Reply to Point 1(b) of the State's Brief) 
The state claims that since Aimee had permissive access to 
the house, her entry into the house and removal of items did not 
violate the Fourth Amendment. See S.B. at 18-22. The state 
bases this claim entirely on this Court's decision in Koury, 824 
P.2d at 478. 
In Koury, this Court relied on Bennett, 709 F.2d at 806 to 
reach the conclusion that: 
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It is not illegal for a private individual, even if 
acting as a government agent, to enter another's home 
if he or she does so with the owner's permission. See 
United States v. Bennett, 709 F.2d 803, 806 (1983) 
aff'd, 729 F.2d 923 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 469 U.S. 
1075, 105 S.Ct. 572, 83 L.Ed.2d 512 (1984). It is not 
necessary for us to decide if [the informant] was an 
agent if his entry into defendant's home was 
permissive. Id. We find no error in the court's 
conclusion that [the informant's] entry into 
defendant's house was not intrusive and therefore, 
lawful. Accordingly, it was proper for him to report 
what he observed in defendant's house. 
Kourv, 824 P.2d at 478. Although this Court explicitly referred 
only to an informant's report of his observations while a guest 
in a home, the state maintains that the holding in Kourv applies 
to the seizure of evidence by a guest, even if that guest is 
acting as an agent of police, as well as the reporting of any 
observations. While the state is correct that the informant in 
Kourv removed cocaine residue from the defendant's house, the 
informant also reported observations he made during various 
visits to the house. This Court's opinion sidesteps the seizure 
issue by referring only to the observations in its holding. The 
holding in Koury explicitly applies only to observations by 
informants who have permissive access to an area, and does not 
directly address the issue in this case of whether informants 
with permissive access may conduct a search and seize items as a 
police agent. 
Moreover, Bennett does not say that a Fourth Amendment 
violation does not occur if a police agent who has permissive 
access conducts a search. Instead, Bennett focuses on whether 
the informant exceeded the scope of his instructions from police 
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officers by searching an area in which he did not have permission 
to be. Bennett, 709 F.2d at 806. The lower court in Bennett 
concluded that as long as the officers did not know that the 
informant entered a bedroom without consent, no Fourth Amendment 
violation occurred; in other words, the lower court determined 
that as long as the officers reasonably believed that the 
informant had permissive access to the bedroom, the Fourth 
Amendment was not violated when the informant searched the 
bedroom. 
The appellate court concluded that the lower court's 
rationale was incorrect and did not justify a refusal to 
suppress. Id. Instead, the appellate court pointed out that the 
government's acquiescence to the search was limited to areas 
where the informant had permissive access; permissive access was 
an issue in Bennett because the officers had told the informant 
to search areas where he had permissive access. Id. The 
appellate court remanded the case for a determination as to 
whether the informant had permission to enter the bedroom, and, 
if not, whether the informant's actions in the bedroom so 
exceeded the officers' instructions that the informant "had lost 
his status as an instrument of the Government when the challenged 
photographs were taken." Bennett, 709 F.2d at 806. 
In summary, if the lower court in Bennett found on remand 
that the informant had permissive access to the bedroom, the 
informant was acting as an agent when he was in the bedroom since 
officers had instructed him to search areas to which he had 
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permissive access. Hence, while far from an example in clarity, 
the Bennett decision appears to indicate that an individual who 
has permissive access to a home or room and who searches that 
area at the direction of the police, is a police agent for Fourth 
Amendment purposes. Bennett therefore supports Appellant's claim 
that the Fourth Amendment was violated even though Aimee was a 
guest in the house when she conducted the search. 
In Watts, the Supreme Court stated that the Fourth Amendment 
"preclude [s] law enforcement officers or agencies from having 
informants do for them what they cannot legally do themselves." 
Watts, 750 P.2d at 1221. The state's argument that the Fourth 
Amendment is not implicated where officers direct an agent to 
search an area to which the agent has permissive access 
disregards this dictate. Officer Delahunty could not search 
McArthur's home; the Fourth Amendment precluded him from sending 
an agent in to search that home and seize items even if that 
agent otherwise had permission to enter as a guest. 
While a determination that an individual had permissive 
access to premises might impact on the knowledge/acquiescence and 
motivational factors outlined in Watts, 750 P.2d at 1221-2, 
standing alone, permissive access does not preclude Fourth 
Amendment protection. Indeed, such a rule would ignore the well 
accepted Fourth Amendment requirement that the totality of the 
circumstances be assessed in determining whether a violation 
occurred. See Watts, 750 P.2d at 1221-2. 
Moreover, assuming Aimee had permission to be a guest in the 
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McArthur house, such permission did not include the permission to 
conduct a search as an agent for police officers. Nor did it 
include permission to surreptitiously take items from the house. 
Since Aimee acted as a police agent, McArthur would have had to 
validly consent to the search in order to meet Fourth Amendment 
requirements. Permissive access to the premises did not end the 
Fourth Amendment inquiry since Aimee's actions exceeded the scope 
of any permissive access she had, and McArthur did not knowingly 
and voluntarily consent to a search. 
A determination of whether Aimee's permissive access to the 
premises precluded a Fourth Amendment violation more 
appropriately requires a determination of whether McArthur 
consented to Aimee's search, or whether Aimee could have 
consented to the search. If Aimee could have consented to the 
search, Officer Delahunty could have conducted the search 
himself, and Aimee's actions as an agent would not have violated 
the Fourth Amendment. As set forth in A.O.B. at 22-30, Aimee did 
not have "common authority over or other sufficient relationship 
to the premises" (see State v. Davis, 965 P.2d 525, 532 (Utah 
App. 1998)) to consent to a search of McArthur's home.2 
2
 The state had the burden of establishing common authority. 
See A.O.B. at 23. While the state did not establish common 
authority in the context of the entire house, it also failed in the 
specific context of McArthur's bedroom. While there was some 
evidence that McArthur and Aimee might have shared a room at one 
time, the evidence as a whole suggested that was not the case when 
Aimee searched the house. R. 114:16, 78, 80. Delahunty did not 
know if Aimee was "living with" Appellant, and both Delahunty and 
Aimee referred to McArthur's bedroom as "his" bedroom, not "their" 
bedroom. R. 114:16. 
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Aimee's permissive entry into McArthur's home does not 
preclude Fourth Amendment protection. Aimee's conduct as a 
police agent in searching the house and taking items exceeded the 
scope of any permission she had to be in the house as a guest. 
Because the Koury holding referred to observations rather than 
seizures, it does not control. The appropriate inquiry is 
whether Aimee could consent to a search. Since she could not 
consent, and under the totality of circumstances pursuant to the 
test outlined in Watts, Aimee was a police agent, the Fourth 
Amendment was violated when she searched McArthur's home and 
seized items. 
C. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT VIOLATION CAUSED BY AIMEE 
ACTING AS AN AGENT AND SEIZING ITEMS TAINTED THE SEARCH 
WARRANT AND REQUIRES SUPPRESSION OF THE ITEMS SEIZED 
PURSUANT TO THAT WARRANT. 
(Response to Point 11(a) of the State's Brief) 
The search warrant was the fruit of the officer's illegal 
activity and the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant must be 
suppressed. See A.O.B. at 33-4. Indeed, despite the fact that 
Delahunty received information from Aimee on several occasions 
prior to the search, he did not go about obtaining a warrant 
until immediately after Aimee's illegal search. No intervening 
act occurred to purge the taint of that illegality and the search 
pursuant to the warrant was not so attenuated as to dissipate the 
taint of the prior illegality. Because the illegal search 
"prompted the securing of the search warrant" (see State v. 
Becich, 509 P.2d 1232, 1234 (Or. App. 1973)) and the illegally 
seized evidence was a "highly significant part of the affidavit" 
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(see State v. Anonymous, 379 A.2d 946, 947 (Conn. 1997)), the 
evidence seized pursuant to the warrant must be suppressed. See 
A.O.B. at 33-4. 
The state advocates that this Court simply excise the 
illegally seized items and determine whether probable cause 
remains. In support of this claim, the state relies on State v. 
Viqh, 871 P.2d 1030, 1033 (Utah App. 1994), where this Court 
upheld a search warrant because after stale portions were 
excised, the affidavit nevertheless established probable cause. 
Stale information is different, however, from illegally seized 
information because stale information does not taint subsequent 
actions. 
Simply excising the illegally seized items would allow 
officers who obtained a search warrant as the fruit of illegal 
activity to benefit from that illegal activity if they were 
nevertheless able to establish probable cause. The exclusionary 
rule purpose of deterring police misconduct is better served by 
determining whether the taint of the illegality was so attenuated 
as to be purged, as advocated in A.O.B. at 33-4, rather than 
applying a mechanical test of whether the affidavit establishes 
probable cause when the illegally seized evidence is excised. 
Even if this Court applies the test advocated by the state, 
when the illegally seized evidence is excised, the affidavit 
fails to establish probable cause. On page 25 of its brief, the 
state outlines the remaining information if the illegally seized 
items are excised. However, this redaction does not establish 
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Aimee's reliability; nor does it include information that Aimee 
was caught passing checks stolen in the burglary or that the 
June 3 0 observations were made while she searched the premises 
for Officer Delahunty. 
While the information in the first three sentences 
demonstrates that Aimee was aware of the burglary and saw items 
at Dominic Newman's house, the importance of that information is 
minimized since Aimee's reliability is not established. 
Moreover, since Aimee was a potential co-defendant who was caught 
forging checks stolen in that burglary, Aimee's credibility and 
the reliability of her statements were highly suspect and do 
little to establish probable cause. In addition, the first three 
sentences do nothing to suggest that any evidence would be found 
in McArthur's home. 
The remaining information is also misleading because Aimee's 
reliability is not established. Moreover, her credibility issues 
are not included and the affidavit does not inform the magistrate 
that Aimee entered the house on June 3 0 under false pretenses 
after Delahunty agreed she should take certain items, transported 
her to the house, and waited in the driveway. 
The critical factor establishing probable cause was the 
production of evidence seized from McArthur's house. Officer 
Delahunty's actions suggest that Aimee's word alone was not 
sufficient. Aimee had previously told Delahunty that items 
stolen in the burglary were in McArthur's home. Because of 
Aimee's credibility problems, Delahunty did not obtain a search 
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warrant until she verified her statements by handing him a piece 
of evidence under circumstances where he watched her enter and 
leave the premises. 
POINT II. REGARDLESS OF WHETHER AIMEE WAS ACTING AS AN 
AGENT, THE AFFIDAVIT FAILS TO ESTABLISH PROBABLE CAUSE 
WHEN THE MATERIAL OMISSIONS ARE INCLUDED WITH THE 
INFORMATION IN THE AFFIDAVIT. 
The state incorrectly contends several times in its brief 
that this Court must examine the affidavit supporting the search 
warrant only if Aimee is an agent for police officers. S.B. at 
9, 10, 11-12, 22. Regardless of whether Aimee was an agent for 
Delahunty, the intentional or reckless omission of the 
information outlined in A.O.B. at 35-43 requires suppression of 
the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant, and the fruits 
thereof. 
The state claims that the omitted information regarding 
Aimee's possible involvement in the burglary and her direct 
involvement in passing the checks did not affect the existence of 
probable cause in the affidavit because the missing information 
actually bolsters Aimee's credibility. S.B. at 28-9. The 
state's argument ignores the fact that Aimee did not implicate 
herself; she pointed her finger at McArthur. Any bolstering of 
credibility which may arguably occur when one confesses to her 
own involvement in a crime did not occur in this case. 
Regardless of what Delahunty may have said to Aimee about her 
pending forgery charges, it would have been reasonable for Aimee 
to assume she would come out better if she helped officers 
convict McArthur. 
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Moreover, the lack of reliability of a co-defendant is well 
accepted. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135 
(1968)(recognizing unreliability of a co-defendant's confession 
implicating defendant); Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 183, 
204 (1909)(recognizing lack of reliability and credibility of co-
defendant's statement implicating defendant). From a common 
sense perspective, a magistrate who was aware that the only 
information supporting probable cause came from a possible co-
defendant would not find probable cause. Moreover, Aimee's 
forgery charges involved crimes of dishonesty, thereby 
undermining her credibility. 
The state also claims that Delahunty's omissions were not 
intentional or reckless. S.B. at 29-30. As set forth in A.O.B. 
at 3 7-9, Delahunty is charged with knowledge of the need for 
accuracy and the importance of establishing the reliability of 
the information. Delahunty's actions in not obtaining a warrant 
until after Aimee obtained items from the house are a strong 
showing of intent. Despite Aimee's information about McArthur's 
involvement and statements specifying various items which would 
be found in the house, Delahunty did not obtain a warrant until 
after Aimee searched the house and took items. Once she took the 
items, he immediately sought a warrant. This demonstrates that 
he had misgivings about Aimee's reliability. Given that 
Delahunty was not willing to seek a warrant until after Aimee 
seized items, Delahunty was well aware of the importance of 
information regarding Aimee's forgery charges, possible 
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involvement in the burglary, and other omitted information. 
Delahunty's awareness of the importance of this information and 
his actions in not obtaining a warrant until after the search 
show that Delahunty's omissions were intentional or, at the very 
least, reckless. 
POINT III. THE CLAIM THAT INCRIMINATING STATEMENTS 
MADE BY APPELLANT MUST BE SUPPRESSED AS THE FRUIT OF 
THE POISONOUS TREE IS PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT. 
The state maintains that Appellant's claim that his 
statements to officers must be suppressed as the fruit of the 
poisonous tree was not preserved for appellate review. S.B. at 
30. McArthur entered a conditional plea, preserving the right to 
appeal "the issue of the legality of the search warrant." R. 51. 
Pursuant to this conditional plea, reversal is required if the 
evidence seized from McArthur's house and/or his statements 
should have been suppressed. In other words, regardless of 
whether this Court reaches the confession issue, this case must 
be reversed to allow McArthur to withdraw his plea if the search 
warrant was invalid. Hence, this Court need not get to the issue 
of whether the incriminating statements are the fruit of the 
poisonous tree in order to resolve the issues before it. 
Contrary to the state's claim, however, McArthur's motion to 
suppress expressly states, " [b]ecause the search warrant was not 
supported by probable cause all evidence obtained as result of 
the search should be suppressed including Defendant's confession 
to the police. Wong Sun v. United States, 83 S.Ct. 407, 371 U.S. 
471 (1963)." R. 26 (emphasis added). In argument to the trial 
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court, defense counsel reiterated that she was challenging all of 
the fruits of the illegal search, including the confession. 
R. 114:102. Defense counsel stated: 
We ask all of the fruits of this illegal search and 
seizure be suppressed. That includes all of the 
physical evidence; also, more importantly, the 
confession that was taken from Mr. McArthur within 5 to 
ten minutes of his -- of the execution of warrants. 
That's clearly a fruit of the search and should be 
suppressed as well, your Honor. 
R. 114:102. 
Appellant's argument that his statements should be 
suppressed is based on Wong Sun and its progeny and was raised in 
the trial court. See A.O.B. at 43-6; State v. Allen, 839 P.2d 
291, 300 fn. 20 (Utah 1992). 
The state challenged only the substance of Appellant's 
Fourth Amendment claim and did not independently argue that even 
if there were a Fourth Amendment violation, the confession was 
not a fruit of that violation. In other words, the prosecutor 
did not claim that McArthur's statements were not the fruit of 
the Fourth Amendment violation, perhaps because, assuming a 
violation occurred, the statements were obviously a fruit of that 
violation. See R. 114:102-06. Nor does the state argue on 
appeal that the incriminating statements were sufficiently 
attenuated from the police misconduct to allow admission of the 
statements even if the police conduct violated the Fourth 
Amendment. See S.B. at 30-32. Instead, the state argues that a 
Fourth Amendment violation did not occur and even if one did, 
McArthur did not preserve his argument that the incriminating 
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statements were the fruit of the poisonous tree. S.B. at 30-32. 
The general rule for preservation of an issue requires that 
a defendant make a timely objection or motion in the trial court, 
specifically noting the basis for the objection, and obtain a 
ruling on the objection. State v. Ortiz, 782 P.2d 959, 961 (Utah 
App. 1989), cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990); Utah 
R. Evid. 103(a). The rationale for requiring a timely objection 
is (1) "[a] timely objection provides the trial court with xan 
opportunity to address a claimed error and, if appropriate, 
correct it,/n and (2) "eliminates the option of foregoing those 
objections at trial as part of a 'strategy that counsel thinks 
will enhance the defendant's chances of acquittal and then, if 
the strategy fails, . . . claim[ing] on appeal that the court 
should reverse.'" State v. Labrum, 925 P.2d 937, 939 (Utah 1996) 
(citations omitted). Where the trial judge has had the 
opportunity to address an issue, " [o]ne of the primary reasons 
for imposing waiver rules" no longer exists, and "the 
justification for rigid waiver requirements is weakened 
considerably." State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1161 (Utah 
1991) . 
In this case, Appellant made a specific objection to the use 
of the evidence in the trial court. The trial judge ruled on 
McArthur's motion, concluding that there was probable cause to 
support the search warrant and that "[t]here were no material 
omissions made which would render the search warrant invalid." 
R. 91. These conclusions necessarily included a conclusion that 
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McArthur's statements and other seized evidence were not the 
fruit of the poisonous tree. Indeed, since a Fourth Amendment 
violation is a necessary prerequisite to a consideration of 
whether the exclusionary rule requires suppression, a ruling that 
no Fourth Amendment violation occurred necessarily includes a 
ruling that the evidence need not be excluded as the fruit of the 
poisonous tree. 
Moreover, the purpose of the waiver rules would not be 
served by requiring further argument or actions in order to 
preserve the attenuation issue. The trial judge was presented 
with the argument, had the opportunity to rule on it, and 
necessarily denied McArthur's claim when he denied the motion to 
suppress. 
Pursuant to the rule advocated by the state, even if a trial 
judge concluded that a Fourth Amendment violation did not occur, 
a defendant would be required to needlessly waste valuable trial 
court time arguing further that evidence was the fruit of the 
poisonous tree and obtaining a ruling which directly addresses 
that subsidiary issue. Such a preservation rule would be silly 
since in any case where a judge has determined that a Fourth 
Amendment violation did not occur, the judge would automatically 
conclude that the evidence need not be suppressed. 
For similar reasons, the state's argument that McArthur 
failed to preserve this claim as part of his Sery plea is also 
incorrect.3 S.B. at 31. McArthur entered a conditional plea 
3
 State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988) 
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pursuant to Sery, preserving "the issue of the legality of the 
search warrant for appeal." R. 51. Moreover, at the plea 
hearing, defense counsel stated " . . . these pleas will be 
tendered under State v. Seary (sic). Should the Court of Appeals 
rule that the search warrant was lacking in probable cause, and 
that material omissions were made in obtaining the warrant, 
Mr. McArthur would have the option of withdrawing his pleas of 
guilty." R. 115:1. Defense counsel reiterated at the hearing 
that the plea was made pursuant to Seryf and that McArthur "would 
retain the right to withdraw pleas of guilty should the Court of 
Appeals rule that the supporting affidavit for the warrant 
executed in this case did not establish probable cause and 
contained material omissions." R. 115:2. To the extent the 
warrant lacked probable cause, due either to the information in 
the affidavit or the material omissions, reversal is required to 
allow McArthur to withdraw his plea. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Appellant Michael McArthur 
respectfully requests that his conviction be reversed and the 
case remanded to the trial court for a new trial or dismissal. 
SUBMITTED this <£3/wl day of July, 1999. 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
c<My 
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